Words, Immaterial Perceptual Abstractions
The above considerations remind us that language, words and all the other hypothetical elements of language (morphemes, grammar, syntax, etc) are also nothing but perceptual abstractions - they do not exist; they are no things; they are no material entities. In this book, I point out - for some peculiar reason it seems that nobody has done that before me - that only things can exist, and what are things, they are substances that we must be able to identify in terms of mass and energy. We are taught already in basic physics that matter is to be defined as any kind of mass-energy that moves with velocities less than the velocity of light (whereas radiant energy moves at the velocity of light; Pauling General Chemistry, 2003: 1-3). This is also expressed by Einstein's famous equation E = mc2 (E standing for energy, m for mass and c the velocity of light). - It is about time that we recognize the principle of relativity also in social sciences. Language, words, and all the hypothetical linguistic particles do not manifest mass and energy and therefore they do not exist. And as they do not exist, then they cannot possibly display any kind of characteristic features either, nor may they be analyzed in any fashion without reference to contexts where they have been expressed. And therefore we have to stop doing social sciences on the analogy of natural sciences. Written texts and the abstract perceptions we form of speech expressions merely represent traces of interpretation of feelings that occur as momentary reflections in the mental processes of human beings.
In reference to the physical definitions of matter, I want to raise a hypothesis on how the immateriality of cognitive reflections could be explained. I remind that thoughts represent reflections of mental processes - or more correctly thoughts represent merely fleeting reflections of a potentially infinite variance of mental processes. Bearing this in mind, I would like to think that a physicist could in principle explain these cognitive reflections in terms of mass and energy. Most probably the physical explanation would point to such a gradual loss of energy on the border of the mental process - in relation to the particular infinitely small sub-process presently reflected in consciousness - that the resulting cognitive reflection could be considered immaterial.